Authors :
Imane Ouchen; Ghizlane Chouay; Amina Erryahi; Zoheir Ahmed
Volume/Issue :
Volume 11 - 2026, Issue 11 - November
Google Scholar :
https://tinyurl.com/4d2hydx2
DOI :
https://doi.org/10.38124/ijisrt/26nov456
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working days from the publication date to appear in PlumX Metrics, Semantic Scholar, and
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Abstract :
Assigning a human reviewer to an AI-assisted decision does not ensure meaningful oversight. Reviewers also need the evidence, authority, and time to identify errors and secure appropriate corrections. Building on Ouchen, Chouay, and El Arabi’s (2026) account of leadership as a governance capability, this article develops a contingency model of how those conditions can be established. The model links responsibility boundaries, decision orchestration, and collective learning to three mechanisms: calibrated reliance, actionable contestability, and verified learning feedback. Their expected effects depend on task evaluability, error detectability, review resources, and incentives.
Keywords :
AI Governance; Leadership; Human Oversight; Human–AI Complementarity; Calibrated Reliance; Organizational Learning; Experimentation.
References :
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Assigning a human reviewer to an AI-assisted decision does not ensure meaningful oversight. Reviewers also need the evidence, authority, and time to identify errors and secure appropriate corrections. Building on Ouchen, Chouay, and El Arabi’s (2026) account of leadership as a governance capability, this article develops a contingency model of how those conditions can be established. The model links responsibility boundaries, decision orchestration, and collective learning to three mechanisms: calibrated reliance, actionable contestability, and verified learning feedback. Their expected effects depend on task evaluability, error detectability, review resources, and incentives.
Keywords :
AI Governance; Leadership; Human Oversight; Human–AI Complementarity; Calibrated Reliance; Organizational Learning; Experimentation.