Authors : Ibrahim Bamisaiye Abubakar; Emmanuel Eneche Onoja

Volume/Issue : Volume 11 - 2026, Issue 5 - May

Google Scholar : https://tinyurl.com/yjp47f5k

Scribd : https://tinyurl.com/ycj42few

DOI : https://doi.org/10.38124/ijisrt/26may1912

Note : A published paper may take 4-5 working days from the publication date to appear in PlumX Metrics, Semantic Scholar, and ResearchGate.

Abstract : The study looks at how ownership affects the quality of earnings in consumer goods companies listed in Nigeria. It uses a research design that looks back at what happened in the past, and it includes all 20 consumer goods companies listed on the Nigerian Exchange Group as of December 31, 2025. However, only 10 companies were chosen for the study using a method where the researcher picks the companies that are most relevant. The data used in the study comes from the financial reports of these companies, and it covers a 10-year period from 2016 to 2025. The study uses a statistical method called linear regression to analyse the data, and it uses software called Stata 13.0 to do the analysis. What the study found is that when institutions own a lot of a company's shares, and when a few shareholders own a big chunk of the company, it can affect the quality of the company's earnings. However, when managers own a lot of shares, it doesn't seem to have a big impact on earnings quality. Based on these findings, the study recommends that companies should encourage their managers to own more shares, but they should also be careful not to let a few shareholders have too much control. Additionally, shareholders should keep an eye on management to make sure they're not manipulating the company's financial reports. Keywords: Ownership Structure, Earning quality, Consumer goods, Listed Firms Financial Reports, Institutional Ownership.

Keywords : Ownership Structure, Earning Quality, Consumer Goods, Listed Firms Financial Reports, Institutional Ownership.

References :

1. Abdelrazaq F. F., Ayda F., & Mohammed S., (2019). Do board of directors´ characteristics influence firm performance? Evidence from the emerging market, Journal of Management Information and Decision Sciences, 22, (2)
2. Abdul R. (2020). Effects of ownership structure, capital structure, profitability and company’s growth towards firm value, International Journal of Business and Management Invention, 4 (4)25-31
3. Abosede A. J & Kajola S. O (2020). Ownership structure and firm performance: Evidence from Nigerian listed companies, Corporate Ownership & Control, 8(4), 4.
4. Adams, R. B. & Ferreira, D. (2007). A theory of friendly boards. Journal of Finance, (62), 217250.
5. Adams, R. B. & Mehran, H. (2002). Board structure and banking firm performance. Working Paper. Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
6. Adams, R. B. (2010). What do boards do? Evidence from board committee and director compensation data. EFA 2005 Moscow Meetings Paper, SSRN.
7. Adams, R., Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2010). The role of boards of directors in corporate governance: A conceptual framework and survey. Journal of Economic Literature, 48, 58–107.
8. Aggarwal, R., Erel, I., Stulz, R. & Williamson, R. (2009). Differences in governance practices between U.S. and foreign firms: Measurement, causes, and consequences. Review of Financial Studies, (22), 3132-3169.
9. Aggarwal, R., I., Erel, M., Ferreira, & Matos, P. (2011). Does governance travel around the world? Evidence from institutional investors. Journal of Financial Economics, 100, 154– 181. 
10. Agrawal, A. & Knoeber, C. (1996). Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31(3), 377-397.
11. Ahern, K. R. &Dittmar, A. (2012). The changing of the boards: The impact on firm valuation of mandated board representation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 127(1), 137-197.
12. Ajala, O. A., Amuda, T. & Arulogun, L. (2012). Evaluating the effects of corporate governance on the performance of Nigerian banking sector. Review of Contemporary Business Research, 1(1), 32-42.
13. Al –Sa‟eed, M. & Al-Mahamid, S. (2011). Features of an effective audit committee, and its role in strengthening financial reporting: Evidence from Amman Stock Exchange. Journal of Public Administration and Governance, 1(1), 39-63.
14. Alhassan, A. F., Bajaher, M. S. & Alshehri, A. M. (2015). Corporate governance, firm attributes and financial performance of Saudi listed banks. World Review of Business Research, 5(3), 282-295. 
15. Ali-shah, S. Z., & Nasir, S. A. (2014). Corporate governance and earnings management: An empirical evidence from Pakistan listed companies. European Journal of Scientific Research, 26(4), 624-638.
16. Al-Matari, Y. A., Al-Swidi, A. K., Fadzil, F. H., & Al-Matari, E. (2012). Board of directors, audit committee characteristics and performance of Saudi Arabia listed companies. International Review of Management and Marketing, 2(4), 241-257. 
17. Amba, I. (2013). Corporate governance-driven to intellectual capital and corporate performance in Proc. The international conference on business, economics and accounting, Bangkok, 1-17.
18. Ameer, R., Ramli, F. & Zakaria, H. (2010). A new perspective on board composition and firm performance in an emerging market. The International Journal Of Business In Society, 10(5), 647 - 661. 
19. Anderson, R.C. & Reeb, D.M. (2004). Board composition: Balancing family influence in S&P 500 firms. Administrative Science Quarterly, 49(2), 209-237.
20. Aoki, M. (2001).Toward a comparative institutional analysis. Cambridge, M.A. MIT Press.
21. Asyifa, D. K. & Andrian, B. P. (2021). Analyzing board characteristics, ownership structure and company characteristic to corporate social responsibility disclosure, Accounting Analysis Journal, 10 (1) 62-70.
22. Babatunde, M. & Olaniran, O. (2009). The effect of internal and external mechanisms on corporate performance of corporate firms in Nigeria. Corporate Ownership and Control, 7(2), 330-343.
23. Balasubramanian, N., Black, B. S. & Khanna, V. (2010). The relation between firm-level corporate governance and market value: A case study of India. Emerging Markets Review, 11(4), 319-340.
24. Ball, R. & Brown, P. (1968). An empirical evaluation of accounting income numbers. Journal of Accounting Research, 6(2), 159-178. 
25. Barclay, M., & Holderness, C. (1989). Private benefits from control of public corporation. Journal of Financial Economics, 25(2), 371–395.
26. Barth, M., Beaver, W. & Landsman, W. (2001). The relevance of the value relevance literature for financial accounting standard setting: Another view. Journal of Accounting and Economics, (31), 1-3.
27. Bathala, C. &Rao, R. P. (1995). The determinants of board composition: An agency theory      perspective. Managerial and Decision Economics, 16, 59-69.
28. Bauer, R. Frijns, B., Otten, R. & Tourani-Rad, A. (2008). The impact of corporate governance on corporate performance: Evidence from Japan. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, (16), 236251. 
29. Bayrakdaroglu, A., Arsoy, E. & Citak, L. (2012). Is there a relationship between corporate governance and value-based financial performance measure? A study of turkey as an emerging market. Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies, 41(2), 224 – 239.
30. Baysinger, M. & Hoskisson, S. (1990). An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of directors‟ composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review, 2, 443 – 465. 
31. Beaver, W. (1998). Financial reporting: An accounting revolution. (3rd Edition). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
32. Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A. & Ferrell, A. (2009). What matters in corporate governance? Review of Financial Studies, 22(2), 783-827.
33. Becht, M. &Roel, A. (1999). Block-holding in Europe: An international comparison. European Economic Review, 43, 1049-1056.
34. Beiner, S. & Schmid, M. (2005). Agency conflicts, corporate governance, and corporate diversification; evidence from Switzerland. SSRN, Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm? Abstract id=666264#papersdownload.
35. Bhagat, S. & Black, B. (2002). The non-correlation between board independence and long term firm performance. Journal of Corporation Law, 27, 231 – 254.
36. Bhagat, S. & Means, B. (1932). Corporate governance and firm performance.  Working Paper No. 17-2005. University of Colorado.
37. Bhagat, S., Carey, D. & Elson, C. (1999). Director’s ownership, corporate performance, and management turnover. Business Law, 885.
38. Bhullar, P. S. & Bhatnagar, D. (2013). Theoretical framework EV vs Stock price: A better    measurement of firm value. International Journal of Commerce, Business and Management, 2(6), 335-342.
39. Bishop, S., Faff, R., Oliver, B. & Twite, G. (2004). Corporate finance. (5th Ed). Prentice Hall, Sydney.
40. Black, B. & Kim, W. (2012). The effect of board structure on firm value: A multiple identification strategies approach using Korean data. Journal of Financial Economics, (104), 203-226.
41. Black, B. (2001). Does corporate governance matter? A crude test using Russian data. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 149(2), 2131-2150.
42. Black, B., Jang, H. & Kim, W. (2006). Does corporate governance affect firms‟ market values? Evidence from Korea. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, (22), 366-413. 
43. Carter, D. A., D'Souza, F., Simkins B. J. &Simpson, W. G. (2010). The Gender and ethnic diversity of US boards and board committees and firm financial performance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 18(5), 396-414.
44. Chaganti, R., Mahajan, V. & Sharma, S. (1985). Corporate board size, composition and corporate failures in retaining industry. Journal of Management Studies, (22), 400-416.
45. Chaghadari, M. F. (2011). Corporate governance and firm performance. International Proceedings of Economics Development & Research, 10. 
46. Chen, C. J., & Yu, C. M. J. (2012). Managerial ownership, diversification, and firm performance: Evidence from an emerging market. International Business Review, 21(3), 518-534.
47. Dalton, C. M. &Dalton, D. R. (2005). Boards of directors: Utilizing empirical evidence in developing practical prescriptions. British Journal of Management, 16, 91-97.
48. Dang, R., Nguyen, D. K. & Vo, L. C. (2012). Women on corporate boards and firm performance: A comparative study. A Working Paper.
49. David, A. C., Frank, D., Betty J. S. &Simpson, W. G. (2010). The gender and ethnic diversity of us boards and board committees and firm financial performance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 18(5), 396-414.
50. Davies, J. H., Hillier, D. & McColgan, P. (2005). Ownership structure, managerial behavior and corporate value. Journal of Corporate Finance, (11), 645-660. 
51. Dechant, E. (1997). An investigation into the determinants of UK board structure before and after Cadbury. Corporate Governance, 8, 133 – 153. 
52. Demsetz, H. & Lehn, K. (1985). The structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences. Journal of Political Economy, 93(6), 1155-1177.
53. Dezso, C. L & Ross, D. G. (2012). Does female representation in top management improve firm performance? A panel data investigation. Strategic Management Journal, 33, 1072– 1089.
54. Durnev, A. & Kim, E. (2005). To steal or not to steal: Firm attributes, legal environment, and valuation. Working Paper. Department of Finance, University of Michigan, Michigan.
55. Easterwood, J. C., Ince, O. S. & Raheja, C. G. (2012).The evolution of boards and CEOs following performance declines. Journal of Corporate Finance, 18, 727–744.
56. Easton, P. & Harris, T. (1991). Earnings as an explanatory variable in returns. Journal of Accounting Research, 19-36.
57. Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management Review, 14(1), 57–74.
58. Fallatah, Y, & Dickens, D. (2012). Corporate governance and firm performance and value in Saudi Arabia. African Journal of Business management, 6(36), 10025-10034. 
59. Fallatah, Y. (2015). CEO compensation, firm performance and corporate governance, an empirical investigation of Saudi Arabian companies. Management Research Report, 3(16), 43-71.
60. Fama, E. & Jensen, M. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 301-325.
61. Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88, 288-307. 
62. Fazlzadeh, A., Hendi, A. T. & Mahboubi, K. (2011). The examination of the effect of ownership structure on firm performance in listed firms of Tehran Stock Exchange based on the type of the Industry. International Journal of Business and Management, 6(3), 249266.
63. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2008). Code of Corporate Governance. Security and Exchange Commission. (NSE).
64. Habbash, M. (2010). The effectiveness of corporate governance and external audit on constraining earnings management practice in the U.K.(Doctoral Thesis). Durham University. Available at Durham E-Thesis online http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/448.
65. Hall, P. A. &Soskice, D.eds. (2001). Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative advantage. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
66. Hamidu I., & Aliyu M. S., (2020). Corporate Attribute of Board Size and Market Value of Firms in the Nigerian Chemical and Paints Industry, International Journal of Humanities and Social Science. 5, 6.
67. Hermalin, B. & Weisbach, B. (2003). Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review.
68. Hillman, A. J. & Dalziel, T. (2003). Boards of directors and firm performance: Integrating agency and resource dependence perspectives. Academy of Management Review, 28(3) 383-396.
69. Hoa N & Robert F (2017). Impact of board size and board diversity on firm Value: Australian evidence, Corporate Ownership & Control, 4(2).

70. Hodgson, A., Lhaopadchan, S. &Buakes, S. (2011). How informative is the Thai corporate governance index? A financial approach. International Journal of Accounting and Information Management, 19(1), 53-79.
71. Holderness, C. G. & Shechan, D. (1988). The role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations: an exploratory analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, (20), 317-346.
72. Holmstrom, B. & Milgrom, P. (2004). The firm as an incentive system. The American Economic Review, 84(4), 972–991.
73. Horváth, B. & Spirollari, J. (2019). Market liquidity and performance monitoring. Journal of Political Economy, (101), 678-709.
74. Iturralde, T., Maseda, A., & Arosa, B. (2011). Insider’s ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence. International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, 67 (120).
75. James, C. M., (1984). An analysis of the effect of state acquisition laws on managerial efficiency: The case of banking. Journal of Political Economy, (95), 355-370. 
76. Jensen, M. & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Management behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, (3), 305-360.
77. Jensen, M. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831-880.
78. Kallunki, J. & Martikainen, T. (1997). The lead-lag structure of stock returns and accounting earnings. International Review of Financial Analysis, 6(1), 37-48.
79. Karpoff, M., Marr, M. & Danielson, M. (2000). Corporate governance and firm performance. Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts.
80. Khanna, T., Kogan, J. & Palepu, K. (2006). Globalization and Similarities in Corporate Governance: A Cross Country Analysis. Review of Economics and Statistics, (88), 6990. 
81. Kim, E. H. & Lu. Y. (2013). Corporate governance reforms around the world and cross-border acquisitions. Journal of Corporate Finance, 22, 236–253. 
82. Kim, H. & Lim, C. (2010). Diversity, outside directors and firm valuation: Korean evidence. Journal of Business Research, 63, 284–291.
83. Kim, J., Krinsky, I. & Lee, J. (1997). Institutional holdings and trading volume reactions to quarterly earnings announcements. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 1-14.
84. Klapper, L. & Love, I. (2004). Corporate governance, investor protection and performance in emerging markets. Journal of Corporate Finance, 10(5), 703-728. 
85. Kogan, N. & Wallach, M. A. (1966). Modification of a judgmental style through group interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4, 165-174.