Authors : Dr. Atuahene Richmond Akwasi

Volume/Issue : Volume 11 - 2026, Issue 8 - August

Google Scholar : https://tinyurl.com/398nbpb5

DOI : https://doi.org/10.38124/ijisrt/26aug616

Note : A published paper may take 4-5 working days from the publication date to appear in PlumX Metrics, Semantic Scholar, and ResearchGate.

Abstract : The objective of this to assess the independence of the Bank of Ghana from 1992 to 2026 is to evaluate how effectively legal autonomy has protected monetary policy from short-term political interference, fiscal deficit monetization, and structural economic shocks, particularly following major legislative frameworks like the 1992 Constitution and the Bank of Ghana Act 2002 Act 612 (Amendment Act 2016 Act 918). To achieve this objective, we rely on legal, operational, goal/target, functional, personnel, financial, regulatory and supervisory independence of central bank indicators (Cukierman et al. 1992). The results show that Bank of Ghana (BoG) has experienced mixed performance under its constitutional and operational independence, marked by successful inflation-targeting frameworks alongside severe challenges from deficit financing and political pressures. The study shows that the heavy financing of state budget deficits and quasi-fiscal operations by the Bank of Ghana severely compromised its operational independence. This practice erased the boundary between monetary policy and government spending, driving high inflation and that led to intense post-bailout scrutiny under the International Monetary Fund framework. The study showed that Bank of Ghana (BoG) had struggled to maintain effective financial and budgetary independence due to persistent fiscal dominance, heavy deficit monetization (direct lending/overdrafts to the government) during severe economic downturns, and the massive absorption of costs from the 2022/2023 Domestic Debt Exchange Program. The study found that poor governance practices regarding personnel independence at the Bank of Ghana included political interference in leadership actions, excessive fiscal deficits, and weak transparency in administrative decision-making. Finally, the result shows that Bank of Ghana faced severe supervisory critiques during its banking crisis, characterized by delayed interventions in weak institutions, excessive regulatory forbearance, and gaps in enforcing prudential rules that later triggered major sector-wide clean-ups and tighter capitalization reforms. In the Post IMF, the first recommendation will be to protect the Bank of Ghana from fiscal dominance and fix its structural independence gaps, the researcher recommends strictly enforcing zero-financing rules on government deficits, legally capping central-bank money creation, recapitalizing the bank's balance sheet, and cutting noncore operational waste. Another recommendation is the constitutional debt limits/debt brake which will introduce clear, rigid numerical constraints within legislative frameworks to limit fiscal expansion.

Keywords : Central Bank Independence (CBI); Operational Autonomy; Goal and Instrument Independence; Budgetary/Financial Independence; De Jure vs. De Facto Independence; Personnel Independence; Bank of Ghana.

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