

Aspects of Rational Choice in Decisions Following The Selection of *Pratama's* High Leadership Positions

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Abstract:- This research aims to formulate participants' rational choices for taking part in the *Pratama's* High Leadership Positions (PHLP) selection at the macro level. The research focuses on the resources that selection participants have, competition and the norms that regulate it, and the presence of corporate actors. This type of research is interpretive with a qualitative approach. The research subjects were Natuna Regency Government PHLP participants, in 2021 and 2022. Data collection was carried out using in-depth interviews and participant observation. The research results show that PHLP selection participants are rational actors who have internal and external resources to compete for limited resources in the form of positions. In competing for this position, selection participants compete with each other which is regulated by formal and informal norms. The struggle for positions through PHLP selection in the regional government bureaucracy cannot be separated from the interference of corporate actors. In conclusion, the outcome of the selection participants' rational choices is not solely determined by the resources they have but is also determined by the decisions of corporate actors. The norms governing competition and the presence of corporate actors show that rational choice is not just a micro issue, but more than that, macro in nature. Suggestions for future research could be to use a quantitative approach to test the validity of these findings. Or, looking at the rationality of PHLP participants from a micro level.

Keywords:- Rational Choice, Job Selection, Resources, Competition, Corporate Actors.

I. INTRODUCTION

The PHLP selection system in local government, if it works ideally, is normal in the recruitment and selection process. In reality, the PHLP selection system is characterized by the practice of buying and selling positions. Some experts refer to the practice of buying and selling in a selection system as a form of transactional authority. Transactional authority assumes that rational bargaining and choice are not determined solely by the principal's limited choices to maximize his utility. Both principals and actors share in setting the terms of their relationship, in part

because they are both trying to solve complex problems (Carpenter & Krause, 2015). Transactional authority involves dynamically evolving relationships and repeated interactions among actors over time (Padgett & Walter, 2012). The PHLP selection system in local government is interesting to research because selection participants have their own rational choices. Rational choices in position selection in local government manifest in the form of buying and selling positions. The buying and selling of positions that are often found in the position selection system is the practice of bribery, gratification, collusion, and nepotism. These practices, in positive legal terms, can be categorized as criminal offenses of corruption. Corruption has many branches, namely state losses, embezzlement, fraudulent acts, extortion, gratification, bribery, conflicts of interest in procurement, and other criminal acts related to corruption. There are 4 (four) criminal practices of corruption, namely gratification, bribery, collusion, and nepotism. This type of corruption often ensnares state administrators, especially regional heads. Buying and selling positions within the regional government because the regional government has not consistently built a merit system or policy and management of human resources and state apparatus based on qualifications, competencies, and performance fairly and reasonably.

In the context of this research, the PHLP selection system that occurs in the Natuna Regency regional government is interpreted as a form of rational choice, not as an act of corruption. Therefore, gratification, bribery, collusion, and nepotism are seen from a sociological perspective, not a legal perspective. The theoretical basis used in this research is rational choice theory. Selection is a process of looking for candidates for certain tasks that can encourage candidates to occupy certain positions in the organization (Biswas, 2012). Rozario, Venkatraman, and Abbas (2019) stated that the purpose of selection is to provide a group of candidates to allow leadership to select the employees needed. According to Omisore and Okofu (2014), selection refers to the discovery and development of required personnel sources so that a sufficient number of candidates will always be available for jobs in the organization. The purpose of selection is to search for or explore, evaluate, persuade, and obtain a commitment from candidates to fill positions necessary for the success of the

organization. Kumari and Malhotra (2013) define selection as the process of creating a group of qualified candidates for vacancies in an organization.

The theoretical perspective chosen is Coleman's rational choice theory (1990) which tries to link "rational choice", "norms", and "social organization", and causes rational choices not only at the micro level but also at the macro level. However, there is a weakness in Coleman's rational choice theory, namely that it does not pay enough attention to linguistic aspects. This is by Favereau's (2005) criticism, Coleman is considered to have failed to integrate "social organization" because: 1) the concept of rational choice borrowed from economists (namely the ability to calculate) is unable to handle any "collective" object; 2) dealing with collective objects requires "language," and 3) language requires that the concept of rational choice subsumes the ability to calculate under the ability to "interpret."

Not much previous research has examined selection systems from a rational choice perspective. Most see the job selection system as part of HR management. The selection system is seen as a process for getting the right people for certain positions. The results of initial observations and supported by empirical realities that occur in several regional governments, the PHLP selection system is very full of buying and selling positions. It is hoped that the results of this research will illustrate the sociological implications of the rational choice perspective that occurs in the PHLP selection system in local government.

PHLP selection in this study was analyzed using Coleman's rational choice theory. In contrast to Weber's micro-rational action, Coleman attempted to reconcile rational choice theory by making a connection between the individual and society, and the historical and normative status of rationality. Coleman offers an important critique of Weber's theory of bureaucracy, which is useful in analyzing the relationship between corporate actors and specific individuals.

II. RESEARCH METHODS

This research uses a qualitative approach with an interpretive type of research. This research seeks to describe the meaning of selection participants regarding the selection process which ultimately influences their rational choices and decision to take part in or not take part in the PHLP selection. The subjects of this research were participants in the PHLP selection for the Natuna Regency Government in 2021 and 2022. Data was collected by conducting in-depth interviews and participant observation. Data analysis was carried out by applying thematic analysis. Thematic analysis was carried out to obtain research themes based on social reality.

III. DISCUSSION

➤ *Selection Participants are Rational Actors*

A rational actor is an individual who makes rational choices based on calculations and information available to him. Rational actors form the basis of rational choice. Rational choice theory assumes that actors are rational, trying to actively maximize gains in any situation and consistently trying to minimize losses. PHLP selection participants as rational actors can be studied when deciding to take part in the selection or not. Rational decision-making assumes that rational actors will make choices that best contribute to their interests. Selection participants can decide whether to take part in the selection process or not, and continue or stop taking part in the selection process. Decisions made by rational actors certainly take into consideration various possibilities, opportunities, obstacles, challenges, and risks that will be faced.

In the case of the PHLP selection for the Natuna Regency Government in 2021 and 2022, the rationality of prospective selection participants was based on information about dishonesty. Prospective selection participants have the consideration or rationality that the officials who will be elected to the PHLP position are cronies or relatives of the elected regent. If prospective participants continue to take part in the 2021 PHLP selection, it will be useless and considered a waste. Although proof of dishonesty is very difficult to prove, in reality, the elected officials who occupy the positions being contested are from relatives or the success team of the elected regent. The proof is that there are people who did not take part in the selection process, but were elected as officials. The decision to participate or not participate in the PHLP selection is based on the possible advantages and disadvantages.

Rational choice begins with the idea that humans are rational decision-makers. Decision-making begins with access to good information, rationally weighing the consequences of various behaviors, and determining which option is the best. Information about the PHLP selection for the Natuna Regency Government in 2021 and 2022 will be disseminated formally through the media in the form of physical letters and on the official website of the Natuna Regency Government. The information obtained by prospective selection participants is a resource that can be used as a basis for considering interests and self-control. The interests of each actor in participating in the selection are unique and individual. This means that each actor has interests, such as taking part in the PHLP selection to achieve prestige, as a symbol of success in a career, and so on.

Individual behavior is conceptualized and analyzed as socially embedded. Social factors imply that rationality, choices, and context-dependent interactions, including types of strategic behavior, are defined, shaped, and regulated based on social relationships among actors and the cultural and institutional contexts in which interactions take place (Burns & Roszkowska, 2016).

Every PHLP selection participant, before deciding whether to take part in the selection or not, starts by obtaining information about the PHLP selection. Information sources for the 2021 and 2022 PHLP open selection can be categorized into two sources, namely formal sources and informal sources. A formal source of information is based on a letter from the selection committee regarding the open PHLP selection. Informal sources of information come from issues, rumors, and gossip circulating among Natuna Regency Government employees. Coleman (1990) calls gossip a way to deal with second-order problems. The argument is that gossip involves confusion between two interests. "Everyone has an interest in maintaining norms and implementing sanctions against those who violate them, so they have an interest in disseminating information that can produce consensus regarding legitimate sanctions."

Rational choice behavior is motivated by individual self-interest oriented towards consequences as perceived or defined. Actors assess or differentiate the costs and benefits of alternative behaviors (their consequences or outcomes), and simply pay attention to the consequences for themselves. Actors choose the alternative with the most net benefit or "utility" in a more stringent formulation, concerning some utility functions. An event, behavior, social process, or institution can thus be explained in terms of the rational choices of individual agents as rational actors.

➤ *Resources for Goal Achievement*

The PHLP selection for the Natuna Regency Government is one of the routine activities in the public bureaucracy or government bureaucracy. Public bureaucracy is attached to a public service ethos that prioritizes regulations and norms of transparency, accountability, and privacy protection. Public servants are expected to act with integrity and impartiality, and compared with other types of organizations, it is evident that public bureaucracies face certain formal obstacles, which can be said to make communication more challenging (Fredriksson & Pallas, 2016). Decisions in the public bureaucracy are regulated by law, government regulations, ministerial decisions, regional regulations, or regent's decisions.

The first resource that is very valuable for PHLP selection participants is information and communication skills. Information includes all forms of news related to announcements, requirements, and the PHLP selection process. Dissemination of PHLP selection information is carried out formally and informally. Dissemination of formal information through various media, such as official announcements, newspapers, social media, and online media/websites. Informal information is spread through social communication by word of mouth, between PHLP selection participants, the selection committee, and other stakeholders. The dissemination of informal information among prospective PHLP selection participants in 2021 has an impact on the lack of prospective applicants. This is due to the spread of rumors that the PHLP selection is just a formality.

To ensure that the public bureaucracy carries out activities by appropriate rules, ensuring predictability and accountability, its activities are morally and legally bound to be open and transparent. Thus, the purpose of bureaucratic communication can be seen as providing the information that citizens need as citizens and voters. In most cases, this means that the public and other interest groups (including the media) must be given general access to documents and conduct adopted or established by public bodies and ministries, public bureaucracies operating in an increasingly complex communications environment (Luoma-aho & Canel, 2021), interact with a large number of stakeholders; starting from politicians, other public sector organizations, society, companies, trade unions, media, industrial organizations, experts and lobby organizations.

The second resource is the internal resources of PHLP selection participants, namely length of service, rank class, career level, last level of education, and experience. These resources are a consideration for selection participants in deciding whether or not to take part in the PHLP selection. Taking part in the PHLP selection is an embodiment of achieving a higher career path. The non-material resources attached to PHLP selection participants are part of the rationality of instruments that can be used to achieve their goals.

The third resource is the social network of PHLP selection participants. A social network is a social structure formed from nodes connected by one or more specific types of relationships such as values, visions, ideas, friends, descendants, etc. Social networks are usually characterized by typical typologies in line with group characteristics and orientation. The strength of the network depends on what angle the network is from, namely considering the origin and at what level the network is located. Community networks are strongest and thickest at the destination level and continue to be weak when looking at regional, national, and international levels (Tinsley & Lynch, 2001).

All state civil servants (SCSs) in the Natuna Regency Government can become a social network when SCSs interact intensely with each other socially based on visions, values, and ideas that occur due to friendships and collegial relationships. It cannot be denied that the selection participants, the selection committee, and other stakeholders know each other. Most of the selection participants know each other, know the selection committee, and some are part of the regent's 'social network'. Among the selection participants some are members of the regent's success team, are relatives of the regent, and have networks with legislative members who support the regent. In several cases of PHLP selection, social networks become social capital that can be utilized for vertical mobility.

Social capital, which is dominant in individual decision-making, has a stronger influence on individual education and is more evenly distributed than other types of capital in society and the country (Golubović & Golubović, 2007). Rational choice theory, whose fundamental conceptual meaning is social capital, emphasizes the fact

that agents act based on rational thinking, that is, using optimization. Optimization is realized in maximizing the utility of a particular behavior or minimizing the burden on a particular behavior and the like. The behavior is compared with the results expected by the agent itself, and it is assumed that the agent will choose the behavior that has the best results. Rational choice theory views social capital as a driver of individual behavior that can result in social mobility.

The findings of this research are in line with Coleman's (1990) thinking about forms of social capital. The social capital found in this research is expectations, information networks, and norms that develop in PHLP selection. First, the expectations referred to in the findings of this research are that each actor participating in the PHLP selection has different expectations. Second, the information network formed in the PHLP selection is formal or informal. Even though the PHLP selection participants are both competitors, in reality, they are an information network that interacts with each other to maximize the resources they have. Third, the norms that apply in PHLP selection are formal rules related to PHLP selection and non-formal rules that apply in PHLP selection.

According to Coleman (1990), there are three forms of social capital, namely: First, the structure of obligations, expectations, and trust. Second, information networks. Information is very important as a basis for behavior. Thus, individuals who have a wider network will find it easier (and cheaper) to obtain information, so it can be said that they have high social capital; and vice versa. Third, effective norms and sanctions. The relationship between trust, reciprocity and exchange, normal rules, norms and sanctions, and connection to society are all important in preventing individual behavior from positively producing good outcomes.

The fourth resource is financial or financial availability. It cannot be denied that the resources to compete for positions are very limited, and financial resources are required. Although most of the research subjects stated that they did not need to prepare large financial amounts because the PHLP selection took place fairly and openly. A small number of research subjects admitted that taking part in the PHLP selection required preparing large amounts of money.

➤ *Competition and Norms in PHLP Selection*

The position or position that is contested through the PHLP selection is a limited resource. The position is a limited resource and is contested by several people, which can give rise to competition. People always compete for limited resources, such as money, materials, and property, to satisfy wants and needs. People also compete for non-material things such as position, power, and success. Competition is the basis for all social relationships that can give rise to conflict and create classes, groups, and social hierarchies. In this context, competition is not only a micro-level reality but also a macro-level reality. Competition becomes part of the social system. When individuals and groups compete for limited resources, they inevitably

experience disparities. Inequality occurs related to professions, rights, or opportunities.

In the 2021 PHLP selection, there were 4 (four) positions contested by 10 (ten) applicants and in the 2022 PHLP selection there were 10 (ten) positions contested by 25 (twenty-five) applicants. That means, in every election, some people win the competition, and some people lose the competition. Competition for limited resources is a fundamental sociological concept and can be defined as the simultaneous demand by two or more organisms for limited resources. All organisms or individuals need resources to grow, develop, succeed, and survive.

Competition is usually thought of as the interaction of individuals competing for a shared resource that is in limited supply (position). In general, competition can be defined as direct or indirect interactions between individuals that lead to changes in fitness when individuals share the same resources. The results usually hurt weaker competitors. There are three main forms of competition, namely interference competition, exploitation competition, and pseudo competition. Interference competition occurs directly between individuals, while exploitation competition and pseudo-competition occur indirectly between individuals (Holomuzki et. al 2010).

When individuals directly change the behavior of other individuals in obtaining resources (position or J), the interaction is considered interference competition. For example, when a candidate (K) does not want to share selection information with other candidates or prevents other candidates from passing the selection, then the candidate immediately changes his behavior by limiting himself from having contact with other candidates. Competitive interference was found in research subjects in the form of self-closing behavior, feeling like they were clean, and conveying incorrect information to other candidates. Interference competition can be depicted in Figure 1 below.




Fig 1 Interference Competition
Source: Research Results

Coleman (1990) uses the term closed network to describe a closed circle of acquaintances, that is, a network consisting of people who know and interact with each other. Obligations and expectations, exchange of information, norms, and sanctions, and relationships with authorities, all of which are considered aspects of a society's social capital, will become more visible if the network is closed. The social capital possessed by each actor can be utilized by selection participants to achieve their personal goals.

The competition mentioned in Figure 1 is related to Coleman's failure to provide a systematic explanation of the difference between an agent's desire to commit (to enter into a relationship) and her ability to do so. In contrast, achievement gaps, which occur at every level of the social structure, are ascribed to structural dysfunctions such as the relative limitations of closed networks (relationships) and their consequence: the lack of norms generated by social capital. Adler and Kwon (2002) stated that network closure is not necessary for the functioning of social capital, while Lin (2001) stated that network closure should be carried out only when certain goals of an individual are achieved. When individuals wish to maintain certain social relationships, network closure is relevant; however, when actors seek and aspire to acquire social capital resources, they require relationships with other actors, so network closure is irrelevant.

Actors engage in social interactions, relationships, and networks as long as the benefits last. This logic originates from rational choice theory which attempts to explain human behavior through rationality. In this sense, social capital is a private and public good that provides benefits to everyone in the group, not just those who invest in organizing the association or network. For example, all PHLP selection participants benefit when a selection committee is formed to help reduce the level of violations. Direct contributions from actors will benefit the whole, not just individuals. Strong solidarity is formed from strong social ties between its members.

Exploitation competition occurs when candidates interact indirectly while competing for a shared resource (position or J). Competition for office by one candidate will reduce the number available to other candidates. Whether through interference or exploitation, superior candidates can exclude inferior candidates from the competition, resulting in competitive exclusion. Exploitation competition can be depicted in Figure 2 below.




Fig 2 Exploitation Competition
Source: Research Results

False competition occurs when candidates compete for positions and the final selection decision is determined by the invisible hand (TT), not from their hard work or not based on the election results. This kind of pseudo-

competition was found in the case of BW who was appointed without taking a test because he still had a kinship relationship with the regent. The same case was also experienced by BD who was appointed as a Government Assistant without taking a test or selection. BD is the wife (Ey) who serves as Head of the Natuna Regency Human Resources Development Personnel Agency (HRD). Ey also became the regent's right-hand man. Pseudo-competition can be depicted in Figure 3 below.




Fig 3 Pseudo Competition
Source: Research Results

The three types of competition in the PHLP selection system above can be categorized into two types of competition, namely real competition (interference competition and exploitation competition) and pseudo competition. To regulate competition in the PHLP selection, social norms are needed. According to Coleman (1990), norms only benefit some of the community concerned, but at the expense of others, they completely ignore norms that make everyone worse off.

A norm is a certain behavior that arises when the socially determined right to control that behavior is held not by the perpetrator but by other people (Coleman, 1990). The results of this research show that, normatively, selection participants and the selection committee have established a norm, that the PHLP selection process must take place openly, fairly, and honestly. If one or several selection participants reject these norms, then those participants reject the legitimacy of the control. Therefore, these participants cannot claim the right to impose sanctions on other participants when there are participants who commit violations in the selection process. By breaking a norm, the selection participant only makes a very small contribution to the destruction of that norm. Normatively, every PHLP selection participant cannot violate general norms in selection. There seems to be a general norm that states that if a person violates a norm, he cannot also express disapproval of the violator without receiving resistance from a third party. Coleman (1990) argues that norms thus defined emerge only when behavior imposes negative externalities on others. In every competition, the impact of the norm is to favor the other party (beneficiary) and harm the perpetrator (target).

PHLP selection participants who do not show a sense of fairness, honesty, and openness can be punished by other selection participants. More importantly, social norms intended to keep the lower classes in their place are often enforced through internal surveillance of members of that class against each other. Actors can internalize conflicting norms because the effect of internalization is only independent policies carried out by each target actor and not mutual maintenance within the target actor group. Internalization creates a tendency in the target to comply with norms even if others do not comply.

Norms can be categorized into two types, namely norms that benefit everyone and norms that benefit some people but harm others. Some norms benefit no one. Norms that benefit all PHLP selection participants come from laws, government regulations, regional regulations, and selection regulations are norms that benefit everyone. The norms that benefit some PHLP participants are various regulations whose implementation is not carried out fairly. The unwritten rule, that supporters of the previous regent must be 'eliminated' or only supporters of the elected regent receive positions, is a form of norm that benefits some people and harms others.

Some norms that have consequences also do not provide any benefits, such as the norm of revenge. In government bureaucracy, when regional heads are elected through regional head elections, there is a tendency to eliminate 'people' from their competitors. The elected regional head will appoint 'his people' to occupy certain positions or offices. Regardless of whether the person given the position or position can carry out their duties well or not. This kind of revenge practice is a form of perpetuating his position to make him safer. The idea that the norm of revenge serves an equivalent function to organized law enforcement in societies with weak states is also a mistake.

➤ *Collective Behavior in PHLP Selection*

Collective behavior provides a framework for understanding group behavior and traits emerge from the way individuals generate and share information. Larger and more complex social networks now transfer high-fidelity information over long distances at low cost. Often, PHLP selection participants achieve this achievement without a leader and without the individual being aware of the collective behavior itself. In groups composed of unrelated and selfish members, natural selection has resulted in emergent and functional group behavior. However, collective functioning can be sensitive to disturbance and specific to environmental context. The context-dependent function of collective behavior raises serious questions for human groups.

Coleman (1990) analyzes "actors' tactics in achieving exchange value". Coleman's opinion, if applied to the findings of this research, is that PHLP selection participants as actors who act alone basically have their ways of achieving their goals. As actors, the control rights of PHLP selection participants over their behavior rest with the authority of the selection committee, local government, and

the norms that apply in the selection system. When PHLP selection participants begin to act collectively, the participants surrender their control rights to the collective. The shift from being a free individual actor, then having his behavior controlled by rules, can be called a "transitional" period. This period was marked by the selection participants' efforts to "determine the level of general sentiment". This general sentiment can be found in the 2021 PHLP selection which was marked by the small number of prospective selection participants who registered. This general sentiment occurs because of the perception that the PHLP selection will not take place fairly and openly. The people occupying the contested positions may be relatives of the elected regent, the success team, and the entrusted people. The general sentiment that occurred in the 2022 PHLP selection was the number of applicants for the selection compared to 2021. The rationality of the selection participants, including that the PHLP selection was fairer and more transparent. By obtaining information from each other that there is a sentiment to participate or not participate in the selection, each actor surrenders their control rights to the collective, and ultimately it becomes collective behavior.

The collective behavior that emerged in the 2021 PHLP selection is a way to solve the problem of free passengers, namely people who are deemed administratively and competently incompetent as pratama high leaders. The people in question are the regent's relatives, the success team, and the entrusted people. Without collective behavior, the negative consequences of free riders, or the costs of such behavior, would be borne entirely by the individual adopting the individual behavior. Those who do not adopt the behavior may benefit from the behavior, and not bear the costs, as long as the behavior is up to the individual. These can be called externalities related to behavior and "their consequences for the individual depend largely on what others do".

When a diverse or heterogeneous group of individuals is involved, with very different reward structures, then collective behavior is more likely to emerge. That is, it may be beneficial for one person to participate in collective action if there are only 2 (two) people involved, and for another person, it may be beneficial if there are 3 (three) people involved. Consequently, the critical threshold for the transfer of authority to the collective can be reduced if these heterogeneous reward structures exist. However, this goes against common sense because it is often assumed that collective behavior is caused by the same sentiment and solidarity, not diversity.

Collective behavior can emerge from individual rational decision-making. PHLP participants who gather or complain via social media, raise preferences or values in carrying out behavior that can control the PHLP selection process. Individually they cannot do this effectively, but collectively they can. Collective behavior can be considered rational in that sense, although Coleman (1990) does not want to label collectives as having rationality. However, the behavior taken is the result of the rational choices of individuals involved in the collective. According to

researchers, "everyone would be better off if there was collective behavior."

Collective behavior posits rational social actors who regularly assess the behavior of others to inform their decisions to cooperate. Collective behavior can be used to investigate governance dynamics. The more actors (rulers) depend on a society for labor, tribute, or other income, the greater agency (or "voice") a society has in negotiating public benefits. Collective behavior places it on approaches that address cooperation, consensus building, and non-elite institutions.

Collective behavior posits rational social actors who regularly assess the behavior of those in power to inform their own decisions (Ostrom, 2009). The greater the dependence of actors (rulers) on society in terms of labor, tribute, and other income, the greater the agency (or "voice") society has in negotiating public interests. Collective behavior, shaped by culture, norms, and ideology, is even more difficult to theorize than rational behavior. Provides one direction, identifying specific interests of social segments that align the agency of its members.

➤ *Corporate Actors in PHLP Selection*

In discussing the corporate actors of the PHLP selection system, it cannot be separated from the corporate concept. Corporations, which are understood in this research, are a very special type of formal organization, namely local governments, which are formed by government mandate or member-based collectivities (SCSs). The formal act of establishing a corporation, which is embodied in a legal contract, is carried out as long as it explains for what purpose the corporation was founded and to what extent, the founding actors intend to control the managing agents and organizations to which they belong. This is a background that can be used to study subsequent deviations from the corporation's initial intentions.

In this study, corporations are in the form of regional governments led by regional heads (*bupati*) who are formed by members (voters). The assumption is that the presence of oligarchy or bureaucratic interests can explain the deviation of organizational goals from the initial goals intended by its creator. Corporate actors here are defined as organized actors who participate directly in decision-making (policy-oriented), are formal organizations, have a constitution and real membership, and are intended to represent the interests of the membership.

The broadest definition of corporate actor equates it with all formal organizations (Scott, 1981). Based on this definition, the state bureaucracy, from the central government to regional governments, can be called a corporate actor. Local governments, as legal entities, have rights and resources and pursue "corporate" interests that cannot be equated with the combined interests of members. In addition, "corporate actors can take actions, utilize resources, enter into contracts, and own property. A more focused definition of corporate actors equates them with formal organizations that participate in decision-making

(Mayntz, 1986). This definition of corporate actors emphasizes the constitutional elements that "define their legitimate domain, membership potential, and operational rules..." (Mayntz, 1986). Although this definition is more focused, it still raises problems, because it places mass organizations and government bureaucracies on an equal footing, even though both differ in their structure and internal dynamics. Mass organizations, such as trade unions or political parties, also do this. Corporate actors who participate in decision-making and/or occupy space in the policy system, but do not have a formal organization or constitution. Actors Such actors, lobbies, or social movements, for example, would fall outside the spectrum of organizations that could also be considered corporate actors.

Another definition of corporate actor emphasizes the tense internal relationships between corporate actors and their members that arise in connection with the task of collective "interest representation". The task of collective "interest representation" is often the reason for the creation of corporate actors. When individual actors form a corporate actor, granting it authority and resources and entrusting it with the right to represent them, to act and negotiate on their behalf.

The key actors participating in the PHLP selection are; the selection committee, relatives, success team, and political parties. All of these can be considered "complete" corporate actors: they participate directly in policy-oriented decision-making, are formal organizations, have real constitutions and a real membership, are meant to represent the interests of their membership, and are often challenged for wrongdoing. define interests. Their decisions result in the establishment, maintenance, and transformation of regulatory regimes regarding income and/or pricing, and sometimes even social welfare measures. Whether legalized or not, these regimes derive their operational power from informal agreements reached by the organizations involved in decision-making. Thus, it can be said that neo-corporatist bargaining structures involve corporate actors to the extent that they involve formal organizations, each of which has a constitution, legitimate domain, owned resources, and membership, into decision-making oriented towards policies that generate profits, the establishment and transformation of government regimes (sometimes or partially legalized). The well-founded observation that "new actors can join while others leave, peripheral and core actors can shift places, communication exchanges are intensified or stopped as coalitions emerge and transform" also applies to neo-corporatist structures, and results in the power of regime transformation (Mayntz, 1986).

IV. CONCLUSION

The participants in the selection for Pratama's high leadership positions are rational actors who have rational considerations when making decisions to take part in the PHLP selection. To compete for positions through selection, each actor has internal and external resources that are used as social capital to win the competition. Like social competition in general, the selection system is an arena of

competition between rational actors to compete for limited resources (positions). Social competition is always regulated by existing social norms, both formal and informal norms. These norms become part of the social structure in the PHLP selection system. The selection participant's final decision, whether they get the position they want or not, is not solely based on the selection scores they achieve. The existence of corporate actors, including the regent, the selection committee, the regent's success team, and the regent's relatives, have an important role in deciding who passes the selection. Actor resources in the form of social capital, competition and governing norms, and the existence of corporate actors, place the rational choices of selection participants not at the micro level, but at the macro level.

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