

Unveiling Indonesia's Maritime Security Interests in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific

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Abstract:- The emergence of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific provides a new nuance in the discourse on the Indo-Pacific that has emerged for a long time. The emergence of this outlook cannot be separated from Indonesia's significant role in several drafting processes. Despite experiencing doubts within ASEAN members, Indonesia is still trying hard to get this regional organization to approve its proposal. This study seeks to trace why Indonesia is so determined to formulate the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. Using Bueger's concept of maritime security, this study argues that Indonesia has an interest in realizing maritime security both at the internal and regional level in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. The interests are in four areas: economic development, national security, human security, and the marine environment.

Keywords:- Indonesia; ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific; Maritime Security.

I. INTRODUCTION

President Joko Widodo delivered an official speech on September 23, 2020, at the United Nations General Assembly. The speech was extraordinary, considering that this was President Joko Widodo's first time speaking in front of the United Nations General Assembly even though he had served for two terms. In his speech, aside from the articulation of the importance of the international community to cooperate in handling COVID-19, he re-emphasised that Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries have paid attention to the Indo-Pacific (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 2020). While Indonesia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has committed themselves to maintaining "peace and security in the region," Indonesia proposed the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo Pacific, which further emphasis "the spirit of cooperation and peace." In this regard, it could be said that in front of the international community, Indonesia addresses its aspirations and puts much hope in ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. The question is, what are Indonesia's motivations?

According to Anwar (2020), ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific is a proposal of cooperation prepared by ASEAN for a "possible common platform for promoting regional dialogue and cooperation, with the potential to transcend the various disparate visions of the Indo-Pacific already put forward by different countries". In this way, ASEAN Outlook

on the Indo-Pacific is aimed at bridging the different and often conflictual visions of Indo-Pacific, while also "encouraging progress" in the region (ASEAN, 2021).

It is widely known that the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo Pacific is an original idea brought by Indonesia to be discussed at the regional level and further be proposed in the broader arena (Anwar, 2020; Roza, 2019). It is noteworthy that Indonesia's proposal on the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific initially received several hard rejections and pessimistic views from external and internal parties from the organisation. Bilahari Kausikan, a senior foreign policy analyst from Singapore, stated that "at present ASEAN is at best agnostic" about the "free and open Indo-Pacific concept" as it still lacked clarity, and thus "too narrow a basis to attract wider support" in early 2018 (Kausikan, 2018). However, at the 34th ASEAN meeting in Bangkok on June 23, 2019, after an intensive lobbying process carried out by Indonesia, the leaders of ASEAN member countries agreed to adopt Indonesia's idea of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.

The consistency and persistence of Indonesia to generate the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific is an interesting issue to understand. This is because there should be Indonesia's solid interests and aspirations in that outlook. Parallel to that, this research would utilise Christian Bueger's framework on the maritime security matrix to map Indonesia's maritime security interests in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. The operationalisation of this concept has a strong reason: ASEAN Outlook on the Indo Pacific is a maritime-based and economic-driven cooperation proposal (see Anwar, 2020). Accordingly, this study argues that Indonesia has an interest in realising maritime security in its internal territory in particular, and in the Southeast Asian region in general, in all components of Christian Bueger's maritime security matrix: economic development, national security, human security, and marine environment. Moreover, this study uses descriptive qualitative methods with a literature study approach. This study will comprehensively analyse all news, journals, books, or documents related to Indonesia's efforts to formulate the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.

The structure of this research would be as follows: firstly, I would discuss Bueger's maritime security matrix for the basis of analytics of this research. Secondly, I would like to analyse the historical discourse on Indo-Pacific and the involvement of Indonesia on this issue through the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. Thirdly, by comprehending the objectives of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo Pacific in its official document and several maritime problems experienced by Indonesia, I would like to analyse Indonesia's maritime

security interests with four elements of Bueger’s maritime security matrix.

II. MARITIME SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW

The study of maritime security is a new branch in the tradition of international security studies. Academics and practitioners began to discuss maritime security at a time when acts of terrorism began to emerge in the early 2000s. After the 9/11 attacks on the United States, the fear of terrorism both on land and at sea grew. This condition was then exacerbated by the increasing prevalence of piracy in the Somalia Sea between 2008 and 2011, which endangered the world trade process. Therefore, it can be said that concern on maritime security issues cannot be separated from the fact that the international security landscape changed after the Cold War. With the end of state-centric security issues, maritime security issues are increasingly spreading and become a term that is being discussed (Bueger & Edmunds, 2017).

The concept of maritime security is still not rigid and is constructed differently by each actor from various fields such as maritime policy, ocean governance, and international security. Keliat (2009) tries to track the development of the maritime security concept by analysing documents issued by the United Nations (UN) through the Informal Consultative Process (ICP) conducted from 2001 to 2009. When viewed from the UN document, it is known that the security concept of maritime security tends to be strongly influenced by the views of non-traditional security schools. However, the concept of maritime security is also associated with traditional security issues. It can be seen, for example, from the decision of The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to include maritime security as one of its objectives in its 2011 Alliance Maritime Strategy.

Efforts to define maritime security comprehensively are urgently needed considering the many events at sea that are dangerous and threatening. Therefore, Bueger (2015) then proposes a maritime security concept that accommodates all the aspirations and perspectives of each actor interested in the maritime world. Because maritime security is still a "buzzword," which means "essentially contested concepts," the accommodative principle is very much needed. In this case, the concept of maritime security means having an obligation to become a framework by which "one can grasp the commonalities and disagreements that the concept of maritime security entails."

In this regard, Bueger (2015) tries to build a maritime security concept with a semiotic approach to build the interconnectedness between various concepts associated with maritime security. The interconnection of terms could make anyone hear the word 'maritime security; he would immediately associate it with other terms. For example, when we hear the word 'fish,' we will automatically associate it with other words such as 'meat,' 'seafood,' or even 'fins,' 'gills,' and most importantly, 'water.' We can see that one word 'fish' can have strong relationships (even influence each other) with the other words mentioned above.

After analysing the aspirations and perspectives of each actor with interest in the maritime world, Bueger categorises concepts related to maritime security: Economic Development, National Security, Human Security, and Marine Environment. From these four concepts, Bueger then created an interrelated matrix as follows:




Fig. 1. Maritime Security Matrix (source: Bueger, 2015)

Bueger put four dimensions into the concept of maritime security has a strong reason. In the concept of economic development, historically, the sea has indeed become a vital economic resource. Most international trade is carried out by sea, and the fishing industry has global economic significance. We can find massive mining in the sea to very promising tourism potential. Not only that, nowadays, the sea is always associated with sustainable economic growth, as stated in the blue economy and blue growth concepts formulated in the 2012 Rio+20 World Summit.

In other respects, the issue of naval warfare, maritime power projection, and the concept of sea power is also consistently associated with maritime security. The concept of National Security emerged from traditionalists who saw the importance of defending the sea as part of the survival of the states. Furthermore, with the concept of sea power, the role of the Navy becomes dominant in maritime security. Furthermore, maritime security is also associated with Human Security. Human security is a breakthrough proposal for an alternative to understanding security in terms of national security since the 1990s. Proposed initially by the United Nations Development Program, the concept aspires to refocus the security considerations on the needs of people rather than states. Human Security itself is part of the non-traditional security issue that emerged after the Cold War. Human Security becomes an essential issue at sea considering the many actions that threaten humanity, such as human trafficking, piracy, or Illegal, Unregulated, and Unreported Fishing (IUU Fishing).

Furthermore, maritime security is also associated with the Marine Environment. The actors who advocate for the Marine Environment are very diverse, for example, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) or the United Nations, as shown by Keliat (2009). In this context, maritime security is defined as an endeavour that addresses the safety of ships and maritime installations. Not only that, but Marine Environment also discussed environmental concerns at sea,

such as the prevention of collisions, accidents, and the environmental disasters they may generate.

III. DISCUSSION

The history of the Indo-Pacific concept can be traced back at least since the speech of the former Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe, in the Indian parliament, who introduced strategic cooperation between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean countries in 2007. Japan wanted Indo Pacific to create a system of openness and freedom in trade between the countries in the two oceans. Aside from Shinzo Abe's speech, the spirit of formulating this concept is also based on the existence of the United States "pivot to Asia" era of Barack Obama in 2011, which was later reinforced by Donald Trump (Indo-Pacific Defense Forum, 2019; Manyin et al., 2012). Furthermore, Australia also, in its Defence White Paper, redefines the 'region of security concern as the Indo-Pacific rather than the Asia-Pacific.'

Why did the Indo Pacific concept suddenly appear and slowly begin to replace old concepts such as the Asia Pacific? One of them is due to the increasing interest in India as a new rising power. India has become an economic powerhouse in the world and is expected to compete with China in the coming decades. Apart from economic reasons, the Indo-Pacific concept has become a dominant discourse due to the increasing importance of the maritime domain in Asia Pacific and India. There are challenging security issues such as the South China Sea dispute and the increase of international trade that passes through the sea communication line between the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. There is also a growing number of terrorism acts, piracy, and human trafficking at sea. Moreover, the competition between the great powers in the Asia Pacific has spread to the Indian Ocean, which has forced the international community to pay attention to this region.

Without exception, Indonesia and ASEAN countries are also aware of the problems in the Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions, as mentioned above. Indonesia and ASEAN also have concerns about the growing rivalry between China and the United States that may disrupt the stability and security of the region. On the other hand, the growth of China and the possibility of cooperation with the country can provide economic benefits. Trade cooperation between ASEAN countries and China provides excellent benefits for the welfare of each participant. The United States, an old and influential power in Southeast Asia, also provides its advantages. Not only a security issue but also economically.

With the awareness between the potential threats and the potential benefits, Indonesia and other ASEAN countries choose the latter option. It means that instead of being trapped in endless tensions and conflicts, Southeast Asian countries choose to work together for the common good. Therefore, Indonesia designed the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. Let us look at the Background and Rationale of the first point of this outlook:

"The Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions are amongst the most dynamic in the world as well as centres of economic growth for decades. As a result, these regions

continue to experience geopolitical and geostrategic shifts. These shifts present opportunities as well as challenges. On the one hand, the region's economic growth opens up possibilities of cooperation to alleviate poverty and elevate the living standards of millions of people. On the other hand, the rise of material powers, i.e., economic and military, requires avoiding the deepening of mistrust, miscalculation, and patterns of behavior based on a zero-sum game" (ASEAN, 2021).

A. ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific: Indonesia's Maritime Security Interests

Indonesia's first attempt to invite ASEAN into the realisation of the Indo-Pacific was carried out by Indonesia at the 32nd ASEAN meeting in Singapore on April 28, 2018. At that time, the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs and President Joko Widodo lobbied ASEAN countries to support the draft prepared by Indonesia. On the same occasion, President Joko Widodo stressed the importance of ASEAN to lead and initiate the Indo-Pacific to become a region that prioritises inclusive dialogue, peaceful conflict resolution and avoids the use of violence. Furthermore, President Joko Widodo also emphasised that ASEAN must use all its efforts to eliminate various forms of security threats in the region and be proactive in establishing a center of economic growth in the Indo-Pacific. President Joko Widodo's view on the Indo-Pacific has then conveyed again at the East Asia Summit on November 15, 2018, in Singapore.

After facing intensive consultations both at home and abroad during 2017 and 2018, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in particular from the Ministry of National Planning and Development (Bappenas), succeeded in drafting a document entitled "Indonesia's Perspective for an ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific: Towards a Peaceful, Prosperous, and Inclusive Regions." This draft brings the principles of openness, inclusivity, and cooperation, emphasising two things: strengthening ASEAN-led mechanisms, especially the East Asia Summit, and synergising them with non-ASEAN regional mechanisms in the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, the draft states three goals of the Indo-Pacific should be: (1) to create an enabling environment for peace, stability, and prosperity; (2) to address security challenges, both traditional and non-traditional; and (3) to promote economic cooperation. They are then manifested into several collaborations: maritime cooperation; infrastructure and connectivity; and sustainable development goals (ASEAN, 2021).

This section aims to explain why Indonesia is so consistent and stiff for ASEAN to take a crucial part in building Indo-Pacific architecture. Using the four elements of the maritime security matrix by Bueger, this section would trace Indonesia's interests, which are embedded in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo Pacific. Based on this explanation,

Indonesia aspires to build an architecture of Indo-Pacific that is suitable for Indonesia's maritime security interests.

B. Economic Development

In the first point of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo Pacific goal, namely "to create an enabling environment for peace, stability, and prosperity," Indonesia wants the ocean, as emphasised by Bueger, to be a source to achieve "prosperity" (ASEAN, 2021). As explained in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, the cooperation between Indo-Pacific countries should be aimed at strengthening the maritime-based economy of the region. In Bueger's Maritime Security Matrix, this endeavour could be included as a part of the economic development sector.

Indonesia's interest in the economic development sector could be traced by its new national policy. Under President Joko Widodo, Indonesia is currently in the process of realising the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF), an ambitious programme carried out by President Joko Widodo's administration to rebuild the country's maritime culture and expand its economy (Iis Gindarsah & Priamarizki, 2015). With the ambition to build a maritime-based economy, Indonesia under President Joko Widodo would improve maritime connectivity and infrastructure, such as building "sea highways," constructing deep seaports and logistical networks, and developing local maritime tourism, fishing, and shipping industries as well. Moreover, GMF also emphasises maintaining and managing marine resources to ensure the country's "food sovereignty" (Witular, 2014).

For example, in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific document, cooperation in the infrastructure and connectivity realm is one of the main objectives. While Indonesia has a formidable aspiration, the concept of Indo-Pacific could be used as an instrument supporting Indonesia's GMF, which also aims to build solid and integrated maritime infrastructure. Hence, it is not surprising that President Joko Widodo at the 34th ASEAN Summit in Bangkok conveyed his idea of holding the Indo-Pacific Infrastructure and Connectivity Forum in 2020. This idea illustrates that Indonesia views that increasing connectivity and infrastructure in Indo Pacific will increase prosperity to the region. However, as COVID-19 has severely spread throughout the world since the beginning of 2020, that event is unwittingly delayed (Thi Ha, 2021).

Harnessing the Indo Pacific cooperation for strengthening the GMF vision is very beneficial. In this context, Indonesia would enhance its trade and investment networks by improving its backward linkages in global value chains, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. Notably, Indonesia is estimated to have roughly \$1.5 trillion for potential economic output from its eleven maritime-related sectors (Verico, 2021). This number could be maximally

optimised if Indonesia joins Indo Pacific, the new regional economic powerhouse in the world. Analyst predicts that the Indo-Asia-Pacific region would be experiencing the fastest economic growth globally and offer the most potential returns for foreign direct investment over the next ten years (Indo-Pacific Defense Forum, 2016). Moreover, an economic scenario with tariff elimination and trade facilitation variables prepared by Rahman et al. (2020) found that Indo-Pacific might generate an additional US\$ 1.12 trillion welfare gain for the Indo-Pacific member countries.

C. National Security and Human Security

In the second point, the goal of the cooperation, namely "to address security challenges both traditional and non-traditional," clearly discusses the spirit of the ASEAN's Indo-Pacific concept, which aims to eliminate both traditional and non-traditional threats (ASEAN, 2021). This is in line with Bueger's conception of maritime security matrix, which states that maritime security includes National Security, which means traditional security, and Human Security, which is related to non-traditional security.

In the context of traditional security issues that occur in the region, the increasingly severe competition between the United States and China, especially in Southeast Asia, is predicted to disrupt the stability and peace of the region. The massive development of China that challenges the hegemony of the United States as an old power allows for a prolonged conflict, and it could even be worse than that (Scobell, 2018). Hence, we could witness the revival of Quadrilateral Dialogue as "Asian NATO" consisting of Japan, Australia, India, and the United States, which is a sign of the intention to contain China (Hui & Hussain, 2018). Furthermore, we could also witness that China's Belt and Road Initiative's foreign policy, which is supported by a large economy and powerful military, has been perceived as threatening the international order that has prioritised compliance with international law (Gong, 2019; Murphy, 2017).

In the South China Sea conflict, for example, it can be seen that emerging China has shown its aggressiveness, threatening the region's stability and security (Santoso, 2020; Thayer, 2011; Yahuda, 2013). Southeast Asian countries in dispute with China are experiencing increasing threats daily as China conducted several unlawful acts in the South China Sea. Moreover, the presence of the United States in these waters with the excuse of maintaining the freedom of passage for its international trade also provides a new nuance in the South China Sea conflict. Although, on the one hand, the presence of America can balance China, on the other hand, this has made the Southeast Asian region a place of conflict between the great powers. This conflict has reduced the centrality of ASEAN and allowed this regional organisation to be increasingly divided (see Mu'aqaffi et al., 2019).

The aggressiveness shown by China in the South China Sea impacts Indonesia. As a non-claimant state, Indonesia tries to prevent the conflict in the South China Sea from escalating to a more severe level, thereby endangering Indonesia's territorial integrity and even regional security. Therefore, Indonesia needs to create a conflict management mechanism that is both comprehensive and inclusive of mitigating this. The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific prepared by Indonesia runs on this trajectory. The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific offers the East Asia Summit to discuss regional security issues for resolving conflicts between countries (Anwar, 2020). It should be noted that Indonesia played a significant role in forming the East Asia Summit, with ASEAN as the main driving force there (Bisley, 2017; Pakpahan, 2013).

In terms of non-traditional security, which is an undivided part of human security, the Southeast Asia region is filled with maritime problems such as piracy, human trafficking, and drug smuggling. In drug smuggling, Indonesia itself occupies the first position as the largest country in drug abuse in Southeast Asia (Prayuda et al., 2019). With a population of 270 million, Indonesia is very vulnerable to the illegal use of narcotics. According to the National Narcotics Agency (BNN), in 2020, 2.40% of Indonesia's population, or the equivalent of 4,534,744 people, have abused narcotics (National Drugs Agency, 2021). Many variables influence the high rate of drug abuse. One of them is because there is The Golden Triangle located on the border between Thailand, Myanmar, and Laos in Southeast Asia. The Golden Triangle is responsible for 60% of the world's opium and heroin production. With this condition, Southeast Asia contributes to the world heroin trade of 160 billion USD annually (Prayuda et al., 2019).

In drug smuggling in Indonesia, 90% is done by sea (Antara News, 2018). With the shape of an archipelagic state and Indonesia's geographical condition dominated by the sea, drug smuggling has become easier to transfer. Therefore, Indonesia feels the need to protect its seas from actions that can harm it. Indonesia's aspirations listed in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo Pacific lead to this: Indo Pacific should be comprehensive maritime cooperation. Not only limited to economic consideration, cooperation in eradicating crimes that threaten human security must also be established. Currently, Indonesia plays an active role in various forums related to combating drugs smuggling as a part of transnational organised crime both at the international and regional levels. The forums are the Conference of State Parties from the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC), Global Forum on Migration and Development, ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC), and the Bali Process on People Smuggling,

Trafficking in Person, and Related Transnational Crimes (Bali Process) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 2019).

D. Marine Environment

Bueger (2015) states that maritime security is also about protecting the marine environment, such as maritime safety and the sea's ecosystem. Interestingly, this understanding is manifested in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, which seeks to intensify cooperation in "maritime safety and security, and freedom of navigation and overflight...." (ASEAN, 2021). The background of this cooperation is understandable since 80 percent of global trade by volume and 70 percent by value is transported by sea; of that volume, 60 percent of maritime trade passes through the Indo-Pacific. The region's economic importance makes it of utmost strategic value (Verico, 2021).

However, the Indo-Pacific region is not free from several security problems threatening the safety of ships. For example, in Malacca Strait, International Maritime Bureau states that 55% of global piracy occurs in this strait (Pangestu, 2019). This condition is compounded by the number of piracy cases increasing significantly. According to the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), until the end of 2019, there was 31 piracy against ships passing through the Singapore Strait and the Malacca Strait. This fact is relatively high compared to 2018 records. The Singapore-based institution revealed only seven incidents of everyday activity during 2018. So, in 2019 the crime at sea experienced a significant increase, more than 400 % (Fajriah & Latifah, 2018).

Bearing in mind these complex problems, Indonesia is trying to solve them through the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo Pacific. While Indonesia is aware that transnational crime would be able to diminish with solid cooperation in the region, Indo-Pacific is consisted several maritime power countries to cooperate with, such as Japan, the United States, and China. As a country where the ocean is more than 70% of the total territory, Indonesia is susceptible to various maritime-related crimes (Laksmana, 2011). Before the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, Indonesia has managed several cooperations running the same issues, such as Malacca Strait Patrol (MSP) (Kusumawardhana & Haridha, 2020). However, it is ineffective due to the limited military resources suffered by MSP's member countries (Pangestu, 2019).

Moreover, the damage to the marine environment in the Malacca Strait is also at an alarming stage. With the fact that extraordinary economic growth in the East Asia Region requires international shipping, it is known that around 100,000 ships pass through the Malacca Strait every year (Calamur, 2017). The traffic density in the strait that connects

the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean has great potential to cause damage to the marine environment and biodiversity, pollution, decline of coastal communities welfare, and contamination of fishing and tourism industries (Octavian, 2021). For example, there have been at least 15 ship accidents in the Malacca Strait per 2015 (Isfarin & Triatmodjo, 2015). Ship accidents that cause oil spills in the Malacca Strait also impact the destruction of marine ecosystems such as mangroves to the loss of the maritime tourism sector in Malaysia (Jaswar et al., 2013).

Due to the potential for further damage to marine ecosystems, an international collaboration that focuses on this issue is urgently needed. Therefore, through the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, Indonesia strongly emphasises the need for cooperation in terms of the marine environment. Indonesia's interests are obvious: Indo-Pacific as regional cooperation should accommodate marine environmental problems suffering Indonesia in the narrow context and Southeast Asia in the broader context. It can be seen from the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, which emphasises the issue of environmental security at sea, protection of coastal communities, and most importantly, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

IV. CONCLUSION

The efforts of Indonesia in establishing the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific have well-founded reasons and objectives. With the lens of Bueger's Maritime Security Matrix, it has become clear that the reasons and objectives lie in the corridor of the maritime security concept. Through the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, Indonesia wants cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region to strengthen each party. Given that Indo Pacific is experiencing a very fast pace development of the economy building, inclusive regional cooperation means an instrument to prosperity in the society.

Besides the economic considerations, Indonesia raises its concerns about traditional and non-traditional security problems. As the rivalry of China and the United States becomes more dangerous and threatens regional stability, including in the South China Sea, Indonesia wants Indo Pacific to be the forum to and strengthen the confidence and trust. Furthermore, Indonesia also faces non-traditional security problems in transnational organised crime at sea. One can be seen from the high number of drug smuggling carried out by the sea. With this condition, through the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, Indonesia wants concrete regional cooperation to eliminate coordinated and organised crime at sea.

The cooperation that Indonesia wants reflects Indonesia's aspirations regarding maritime security. As an archipelagic

country whose characteristics sea dominate its territory, Indonesia has experienced many problems in terms of maritime security. For example, in terms of the marine environment, the Malacca Strait, which connects the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, has two crucial problems, namely piracy, which threatens the safety of ships and damage to the marine environment due to the density of ship traffic in the strait. As a collaboration that connects countries in the two oceans, Indonesia wants the Indo-Pacific to play a role in the marine environment when referring to Bueger's maritime security matrix.

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